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THINGS FALL APART

Heidegger on the constancy and finality of death

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In a famous paper pondering what he calls “the tedium of immortality,” Bernard Williams steers a middle course between two inadequate conceptions of death. The first is the Epicurean idea that death is nothing to fear, or even regret, since to be dead is not to be, hence not to suffer. Your future nonbeing, after all, cannot possibly matter to you when it would have to matter to you in order to constitute a misfortune, namely, where you are dead. The second conception is the far more widespread and stubbornly persistent attitude of sheer existential anguish, often followed up by the fanciful thought that we would be better off not having to die at all.

Williams thinks neither conception is tenable. Death is indeed a kind of misfortune – not because being dead is somehow unpleasant, but because the loss of (our own) life is a loss we genuinely suffer, depriving us, as it does, of the ultimate condition for acting to satisfy “categorical desires,” by which he means desires that do not presuppose our being alive to enjoy their satisfaction, but that instead give us reasons to want to keep living.¹ Against the desperate yearning for immortality, however, Williams maintains that an endless life would be literally unlivable – not just contingently boring, but necessarily incoherent, impossible to comprehend as *one* life, as the life of someone perpetually absorbing and learning from new experiences and being engaged with the world.

Williams’s reflections go a long way toward showing that death, far from being a mere unlucky accident, positively shapes and conditions a life as a (potentially) meaningful whole, in contrast to the inevitably desolate expanse of an interminable existence. The concept of death he takes for granted, however, and indeed the one prominent in most philosophical discussions of the subject, fails to identify not only the way in which death is deeply interwoven with life, but also the deep source of our anxiety about it. For Williams, as for both common sense and the philosophical tradition, that is, dying is simply the final event marking the termination of a life, the transition from being alive to being dead.

That kind of dying is not what Heidegger means by “death” in the existential sense, and yet we can hear in Williams’s argument a faint echo of the ontological and quasi-ethical upshot of Heidegger’s account of death in *Being and Time*, namely, that dying is an essential structure of human existence, and that embracing our finitude is a necessary condition of caring resolutely and wholeheartedly for the things we care about, which is to say, the cares that make us who we are and make our lives worth living.

The thirty-odd pages of the first chapter of the Second Division of *Being and Time*, entitled “The Possibility of Dasein’s Being Whole and Being toward Death,” are some of the most fascinating, but also some of the most puzzling and problematic in the book. Heidegger’s purpose is to show how and why dying is not just an external contingency, a *de facto* stroke of bad luck that befalls us at the end of our lives, but a structural dimension of existence, a kind of necessary limit or boundary constitutive of being-in-the-world.

Crucial to his argument is the essential asymmetry, indeed the ontological incommensurability, of *my* death with the deaths of *others*. For we experience the deaths of others by surviving them, and once they are dead, Heidegger says, we can still be said to be “with them,” mourning them, burying them, and so on (SZ 238–9).² My own death, by contrast, is nothing like that, for the obvious reason that it is the one death that, necessarily, I do not survive. As Wittgenstein says in the *Tractatus*, “Death is not an event (*Ereignis*) in life: we do not live to experience death.”³ That I do not survive my own death sounds obvious, even trivial; and that my own death is my own is, formally speaking, a tautology. Nevertheless, such propositions are not empty, for they point up the fact that we are each related to our own death in a uniquely uncircumventable way. Heidegger writes,

*No one can take another’s death away from him. ... Dying is something every Dasein must take upon itself ... Death, insofar as it “is,” is in every case essentially mine. ... Dying shows that death is ontologically constituted by mineness and existence. Dying is not an event (*Begebenheit*), but rather a phenomenon to be understood existentially ... (SZ 240)*

Delmore Schwartz once said, “Existentialism means that no one else can take a bath for you.”⁴ That quip, it seems to me, far from exposing what Heidegger calls the “mineness” of death as something trivial, instead indicates its structural analogy with the mineness of the body. For just as I cannot survive my own death, neither can I step back and observe my own body, for as Merleau-Ponty says, “I would need a second body to be able to do so, which would itself be unobservable.”⁵ Similarly, like the edge of my visual field, I cannot apprehend sideways on or objectively the limit or boundary that is my own death: “The region surrounding the visual

field is not easy to describe, but it is certainly neither black nor gray.”⁶ The same can be said of death. Again, Wittgenstein: “Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.”⁷

I “have” my own death and my own body, then, in a fundamentally different way than I have, say, my own friends and my own money. That I cannot in principle shed them, give them up, get around them, or exchange them for new ones marks them as occupying a different ontological status in relation to me. Or better yet, like my body, my death stands in no mere *relation* to me, but is, as Heidegger says, “nonrelational” (*unbezüglich*) (SZ 263). It is not anything distinct from me, but constitutes me by individuating me, marking me as the one I am. This is why Heidegger says at one point, “death is just one’s own (*je nur eigener*)” (SZ 265).

That death is a nonrelational, individuating dimension of our finitude is an idea Heidegger and Wittgenstein share. Heidegger goes farther, however, in a crucial way. To say that death is nonrelational is not just to say that it is “essentially mine,” but moreover that it

must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just “belong” indifferently to one’s own Dasein, but rather *lays claim to* (*beansprucht*) it *as a single individual* (*als einzelnes*). The nonrelationality of death ... individualizes (*vereinzelt*) Dasein down to itself. (SZ 263)

This idea – that Dasein must somehow take up or take on its own death – follows from, or is at least consonant with, Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as the entity whose existence is an issue for it. Death, understood as a constitutive structure of existence, that is, does not just *individuate* Dasein the way the matter or form of an object individuates it. It also *individualizes* Dasein by laying claim to it, or more precisely by *looming* as an issue, a question, a problem, something “standing before” us, “something *toward which* Dasein *comports itself*” (SZ 250).

How do we “comport” ourselves toward our own death? Here it is necessary to draw some distinctions. It has become a commonplace among Heidegger scholars to say (as I often find myself saying) that by “death” Heidegger does not mean what we ordinarily mean by that word, namely the momentary event marking the transition from being alive to being dead, an event that I can observe (and survive) in others, but not in myself. “Perishing” (*Verenden*) is Heidegger’s name for “the ending of a living thing” (SZ 240). But “Dasein does not simply perish”; in fact, Heidegger says, “Dasein never perishes” (SZ 247). The death of a human being is not mere organic extinction, any more than dining is mere digestion. When Dasein “dies” its death is “demise” (*Ableben*), which Heidegger calls “an intermediate phenomenon” between organic perishing and “authentic” (*eigentlich*) existential

dying. Demise, Heidegger says, is Dasein's "ending without authentically dying" (SZ 247). Dying "authentically" does not here mean *really* dying or dying *resolutely*, but as William Blattner puts it, dying "ownedly."⁸ The reason "ownedly" is a good translation of *eigentlich* in this context is that it refers to the death that is one's own, in contrast to the ending of a life that one survives, namely someone else's. Demise is thus not an "inauthentic" kind of death in the quasi-ethical sense of that word, but rather death regarded as not one's own, from a third-person point of view – precisely the view I can never have of my own death.

Why does Heidegger apply the word "demise" to something unique to Dasein, something over and beyond mere perishing? He doesn't say so, but I take it the point is to mark the ending of a "life" in the *biographical* as opposed to the biological sense of that word. A life in the biographical sense is what we describe when we tell the story of a person's life; a life in this sense is intelligible to us in the form of a *narrative* (or a cluster of loosely connected narratives, or even failed or incoherent narratives). A life in this sense can come to an end well before a person's vital functions cease. Heidegger doesn't put it this way, but I would suggest that a person's life ends in this biographical sense when the story of her life comes to an end, that is, when there is nothing, or rather nothing significant, left to say about what she did or suffered.

"Death" in the *existential* sense of the word is something else again. It is neither biological perishing nor biographical demise; it is not any terminal event at the end of life at all, understood either organically or narratively. And yet it does in some sense loom or stand before Dasein as its own. Existential death is some other kind of looming or impending finitizing limit viewed from my own first-person perspective. Unlike the biological or biographical event marking the end of my life, existential death is something phenomenally manifest in my existence, and indeed as soon as and as long as I exist. It is the manifest finitude of my existence, temporally coextensive with my life, from beginning to end. "Death is a way of being that Dasein takes on as soon as it is" (SZ 245)⁹; "Dasein is factually dying as long as it exists" (SZ 251).

What kind of limit or finitude can this be, if not merely the chronological limit marked by the hour of my demise? The answer lies in what it means to say that Dasein comports itself toward its own death. To make sense of that claim, consider first Heidegger's definition of existential death, namely "the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" (*Nicht-mehr-dasein-könnens*), "the possibility of the utter impossibility of being-there" (*Daseinsunmöglichkeit*) (SZ 250), and "the possibility of the impossibility of any existence (Existenz) at all" (SZ 262). What kind of possibility is that?

The single most important innovation in the account of death in *Being and Time*, I believe, lies in Heidegger's invocation of the existential concept of possibility as something *into which Dasein projects*, in contrast to the more traditional and familiar categorial notion of contingency or potentiality,

something that simply might or can be. That phrase, “might or can be,” shows that categorial possibility is parasitic on actuality: to be possible is to be possibly actual. Existential possibility, by contrast, grounds the very different form of actuality peculiar to Dasein. So, for instance, actually being, say, a friend or a teacher or a recluse is grounded in the worldly possibilities, or what William James calls “live options,” into which one projects by way of taking up and taking on those identities.

Death understood as a possibility in this existential sense, then – that is, as something into which I project – cannot be the event at the end of my life, but must instead be a dimension of existence accessible to me, something immanent in the phenomenal structure of my being-in-the-world. How is my own death manifest and accessible to me while I am still alive? Not in my being-at-an-end (*Zu-Ende-sein*), Heidegger says, but in my being toward the end (*Sein zum Ende*). Indeed, Heidegger says, “Death is Dasein’s ownmost (*eigenste*) possibility” (SZ 263).

So, to call death “the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there,” the possibility “*of the impossibility of existing at all*” (SZ 262), is not to say that it *might* happen to me and that it will thereafter be impossible for anything to happen to me, because I will be dead. That would be categorial, not existential, possibility. An existential possibility is something into which I project. So, what am I projecting into in projecting into my own death? The impossibility of existence. But again, that cannot mean being dead. Impossibility, like possibility, must be an existential notion, and if possibilities are what define me, then impossibilities are what define me negatively. They are what or who I am not, or rather *cannot* be. And indeed, we are always dying inasmuch as all projecting into possibility is at once a projecting into impossibility, that is, negative determinations of what or who I am. For every possibility that opens up for Dasein, others are constantly being closed off. What Heidegger’s existential account of death reveals, then, is that Dasein’s projection into future possibilities turns out to have a twofold structure: every possibility open to Dasein leaves in its wake other possibilities that have been shut down, rendered null and void. All possibility is bounded and conditioned by a horizon of impossibility.

Our possibilities are thus constantly dropping away into nullity, and this is what Heidegger means when he says – what might sound otherwise either hyperbolic or just false – that “Dasein is factually dying as long as it exists” (SZ 251). To say that we are always dying is to say that our possibilities are constantly closing down around us. We can simply resign ourselves to this fact, which is what Heidegger calls disowned or inauthentic dying, merely “expecting” (*Erwarten*) death, or we can embrace our projection into impossibility wholeheartedly in what he calls owned or authentic “running forth into death” (*Vorlaufen in den Tod*) (SZ 263).

But now we have a problem. The foregoing account of existential death is the one I myself proposed some years ago.¹⁰ But it can’t be right. Yes,

possibilities are always closing down, dying off to us as we die to them. Likewise, though, as critics were quick to point out, “Possibilities are also always opening up,”¹¹ and Heidegger calls death the possibility not just of *an* or *some* impossibility of existence, but of the “utter” (*schlechthinnig*) impossibility of being-there (*Dasein*), the impossibility of existing “at all” (*überhaupt*). Though *constant*, death is also, in a word, *terminal*. My interpretation (unlike others) explains Heidegger’s claim that we are *always* dying, that “Dasein is factually dying as long as it exists” (SZ 251). But it fails to make sense of the *utterness* of the impossibility. My reconstruction, that is, captures the constancy but not the finality of death, as Heidegger conceives it. Can both features be accommodated in his account?

Or more to the point, does my construal of the constancy of dying as the constant closing down of possibilities leave room for an account of death’s finality *without* merely reverting to the terminal character of death ordinarily conceived, namely the perishing or demise that occurs at the end of life, and only then? To say that Heidegger must, contrary to his intentions, avail himself of those ordinary notions would be to admit defeat, to concede that the existential concept of death in *Being and Time* is not really distinct from the ordinary notion, after all, hence that the existential account, far from providing any deep original insight into the finitude of human existence as such, is just a rehashing of familiar platitudes about death and dying ordinarily conceived. As we have seen, viewed in light of the ordinary concept of death, the claim that “No one can take another’s death away from him” (SZ 240) sounds either false or trivial. That death “is coming” and is “certain” (SZ 257) is true enough, but banal. Even Heidegger’s claim that “Dasein is factually dying as long as it exists” (SZ 251) loses all appearance of profundity, if it means only what the 14th-century poet Johannes von Tepl meant, namely, that you’re never too young to die, or what Saint Augustine (at least sometimes) seems to have meant, namely, that there is no sharp temporal boundary between living and dying (as opposed to being dead), just as there is no unique point at which the sun *begins* to set (as opposed to *having* set). To say that we are already dying as soon as we are living in *that* sense is like saying that the sun is already setting as soon as it rises – an assertion that can be true only by being uninteresting.

William Blattner has come very close to satisfying this *desideratum* by reminding us that Heidegger conceives of existential death as very nearly identical, or more precisely coextensive, with anxiety (*Angst*). In its psychological manifestation, existential *Angst* is very like what we ordinarily call “anxiety” or “depression.” Phenomenologically, it is a feeling of uncanniness or unsettledness (*Unheimlichkeit*), of “not being at home” (*Nicht-zuhause-sein*) (SZ 188). Consonant with my own construal of existential death as the closing down of possibilities, Heidegger says that in anxiety, “Everyday familiarity collapses” (SZ 189). Like death, “Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world” (SZ 187). And if that weren’t enough,

“Being toward death is essentially anxiety” (SZ 266). For Heidegger, Blattner says, “Death turns out to be the same experience as anxiety.”¹²

Heidegger maintains that Dasein always has an understanding of itself and is always in some mood or other, and Blattner very plausibly proposes that anxiety is the mood proper to or congruent with the understanding of ourselves as finite, vulnerable selves, threatened in our very being by the possible collapse of our world and our identity, which is to say, our sense of who we are and what we’re living for. “Death,” Blattner writes, “is the self-understanding that belongs to this experience, anxiety is its mood.”¹³ He continues:

No self-understanding is immune to being undercut by anxiety; anything we take for granted about ourselves can be dissolved by the corrosive effects of anxiety. Dasein’s existential finitude (limitedness) is its constant, because essential, vulnerability to anxiety/death. ... death is the end of Dasein in the sense of the limit-situation in which the finitude of our being as ability-to-be is exposed.¹⁴

Moreover, “To be existentially certain of death is to understand that it is always possible that it could strike at any moment. ... there is nothing about us that shields or protects us from the threat of existential anxiety.”¹⁵

Blattner is right that Heidegger very nearly equates death and anxiety, both explicitly and implicitly by saying the same things about the two. His reading also finds support in Heidegger’s remark that “*The disposedness (Befindlichkeit) that is able to hold open the constant and utter threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized being, is anxiety*” (SZ 265–6). The mood that exposes us to the threat of death is anxiety.

Blattner’s interpretation also has an obvious advantage over mine (my former view), since my account of death as the constant closing down of possibilities says nothing about that syndrome dwindling down to a zero point in the “utter” impossibility of existence, the final termination of *all* possibilities. The existential collapse of our world and our identity in anxiety, by contrast – that is, our losing our sense of who we are and what we’re living for – can indeed be total, which is to say *final* or *terminal*, though again not necessarily having anything to do with the chronological end of life.

Unfortunately, Blattner’s account fails to satisfy the *desideratum* that my account does (or did) satisfy, in spite of its other flaws. That is, Blattner construes existential death as anxiety, but anxiety in its concrete *psychological* manifestation, namely, as an occasional contingent episode in which our everyday familiar world collapses, along with our sense of who we are and what we’re living for. This kind of extreme, even catastrophic psychological crisis, it seems to me, is what Heidegger refers to when he says, “With the

dominance of falling and publicness, ‘authentic’ (*eigentlich*) anxiety is rare” (SZ 190). That is, thanks to our typical average everyday shallowness and distraction, palpable episodes of genuine anxiety, in which we come face-to-face with our radical *Unheimlichkeit*, our not being at home in the world, very seldom actually occur. Because Blattner equates existential dying with that concrete but rare psychological occurrence, his account leaves no room for Heidegger’s insistence that “Death is a way of being that Dasein takes on as soon as it is” (SZ 245), that “Dasein is factually dying as long as it exists” (SZ 251).

Further, on Blattner’s account, understanding oneself authentically by “running forth into death” coincides with an authentic disposedness or attunement that Heidegger calls “readiness for anxiety” (*Bereitschaft zur Angst*) (SZ 296). Authentic resoluteness, for Blattner, involves “throwing oneself into the possibility of death, and being prepared for the attendant anxiety.”¹⁶ But again, this makes it sound as if the “possibility” of death is the mere *categorical* possibility of something that might (or might not) happen, rather than the kind of possibility into which one projects – and indeed, in the case of death, into which one is *always* projecting as one’s “ownmost” possibility – and that resolute Dasein’s “readiness” for it is something like the readiness of the fire department to put out fires, just in case they happen to occur.

But anxiety is not, for Heidegger, just an occasionally occurring psychological episode; it is the kind of existential disposedness or attunement, felt or unfelt, that discloses our essential uncanniness, our not-at-homeness, or – as Hubert Dreyfus translates *Unheimlichkeit* – our *unsettledness*. Human existence, understood as inhabiting a world and pressing into an identity, is not just vulnerable to collapse as a contingent disposition, in the way a glass is vulnerable to shattering; existence is instead essentially, constantly, permanently unsettled, whether we explicitly know or feel its unsettledness or not. Anxiety does not just befall us sometimes; we are instead at bottom existentially anxious. Heidegger writes, “anxiety, as a fundamental disposedness (*Grundbefindlichkeit*), belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein’s being-in-the-world” (SZ 189), and “anxiety always already latently determines being-in-the-world” (SZ 189).¹⁷

Combining the virtues of Blattner’s account and mine, then, it looks as if we need to say *both* that existential death is the *total* (not just partial) closing down or dying off of possibilities *and* that that total closing down or dying off of possibilities is something that is *always* (not just sometimes, let alone rarely) happening. On the one hand, it is not enough to say that worlds and lives sometimes collapse in the way glass sometimes shatters and houses sometimes burn down. On the other hand, it is absurd to say that human lives are constantly spiraling into psychological anxiety and despair. The (perhaps slow, quiet) collapse of possibilities that constitutes existential dying, that is, must be modally undifferentiated: it is neither a merely contingent categorical *possibility* nor a demonstrable *necessity*, but instead a primitive fact

about, or primordial structure of, being-in-the-world. Another way of putting this is to say that Heidegger's assertion that Dasein projects into death, its ownmost possibility, as the *utter* impossibility of existence, the impossibility of existing *at all*, is unarticulated with respect to quantification: the claim is neither merely that *some* possibilities die off (and some don't) nor that *all* do, but rather that possibilities just *do* die off. Not that they *might* or *must*, or that *some* or *all* do – but simply that *they do*. In the words of William Butler Yeats (and, following him, Chinua Achebe), *things fall apart*. They just do.

The sentence "things fall apart" is what linguists call a *generic*.¹⁸ The semantics of generic sentences is notoriously difficult to represent formally precisely because they can't be paraphrased with explicit quantifiers such as *all*, *most*, or *some*. Obviously, "birds fly" is true, even though not *all* birds fly. Most do. But the sentence "birds lay eggs" and "sharks attack swimmers" are also true, even though not even *most* do that. And the sentences "chickens are hens" and "chickens are roosters" are both false, even though *most* chickens are hens and *some* chickens are roosters. Interestingly, whereas the formal representation of the truth conditions of generics is a subject of controversy among linguists and philosophers of language, three-year-olds seem to have no trouble using and understanding them, well before they master the seemingly more straightforward quantifiers *all*, *most*, and *some*.

What I want to suggest is that the proposition that Dasein's possibilities close down into nothing – that they just *do*, not that they might or must – should be understood as a *generic*, asserting neither the mere possibility nor the strict necessity, but rather the bare actuality – in Heidegger's jargon, the *facticity* – of that terminal closure. Or, to put the point in terms of quantification rather than modality, the claim is neither merely that *some* possibilities close down nor that *all* do without exception, nor even that *most* (say, more than half) do, but again, simply that *they do*. Projects and commitments just *do* tend to unravel and fall apart with the passage of time and the effects of fatigue and age, even if not *all* of them do, and even if they do not do so as a matter of strict or demonstrable necessity.

The primitive intelligibility of generics, readily available even to very young children, arguably lies in their drawing either on paradigm cases that intuitively define or at least characterize a kind ("birds fly") or on cases made especially salient by danger or anxiety ("sharks attack swimmers"). Existential death obviously qualifies on both counts: mortality has defined or at least characterized human existence for as long as recorded history testifies ("Must I die?" Gilgamesh cries); moreover, mortality is salient for us precisely because it is the cause and occasion – perhaps *the* cause and occasion *par excellence* – of anxiety.

Recognizing the claim about the closing down of possibilities as a generic, I believe, helps make sense of Heidegger's characterization of authentic

resoluteness as a “readiness for anxiety.” For just as anxiety is not an occasional psychological episode, but an attunement to the essential unsettledness of existence, so too resolute Dasein’s readiness for anxiety cannot just consist in being prepared for it or expecting it to happen. Indeed, merely “awaiting” (*Gewärtigen*) or “expecting” (*Erwarten*) possibilities, including death, to come along – to become actual, to become present – is, according to Heidegger, the inauthentic or disowned (*uneigentlich*) way of projecting into the future (*SZ* 261–2, 337). To project into the future authentically is not merely to await or expect it *qua* actuality, but to “run forth” (*Vorlaufen*) into it *qua* possibility. And indeed, *Bereitschaft* in German, like “readiness” in English, can mean either *preparedness* for some future event, or (something like) *ability*, *competence*, or *willingness* with respect to something. In short, being “ready for” something means being *up to it*.¹⁹ Again, the fire department is “ready” for fires by being *prepared* to put them out. By contrast, when I “readily” admit something, I do so easily, without difficulty or hesitation. When Hamlet says, “The readiness is all” (5.2.218), he is saying that instead of worrying about exactly *when* one will die (“If it be now, ’tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come”), one ought to act with wholehearted commitment – in his case, the commitment he has finally resolved upon to avenge his father.

To acknowledge that “things fall apart,” that lives are not just in principle vulnerable, not just susceptible to potential crisis, but rather – like soap bubbles – essentially and constantly *prone* to dissolution and collapse, is to recognize that lives and the projects that make them worth living are delicate, indeed *precious*. Dying understood as that essential proneness to collapse just *is* the preciousness of life. Without it, life would be empty, much in the way Bernard Williams supposes it would be, were it merely interminable.

Notes

- ¹ Williams, "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality." *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,), 86. I think Williams is right to say that the loss we suffer in dying consists precisely in *dying* rather than in being dead. Still, it's worth bearing in mind that dying is *terminal* only by being a dwindling down to nothing. Hence Thomas Nagel's remark, "I should not really object to dying if it were not followed by death." Nagel, "Death," *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3 n1.
- ² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927; 15th ed. 1979), 238–9. Hereafter *SZ*, translations mine.
- ³ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, trans. (London and New York: Routledge, 1974), 6.4311.
- ⁴ Schwartz, *The Ego Is Always at the Wheel: Bagatelles* (New York: New Directions, 1987), 7.
- ⁵ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*. D. Landes, trans. (London: Routledge, 2012), 93; *Phénoménologie de perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 2005), 120.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 6 (28).
- ⁷ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.4311.
- ⁸ Blattner, *Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (London and New York: Continuum, 2006), 146.
- ⁹ Here, for good measure, Heidegger quotes *Der Ackermann aus Böhmen* (1400) by the poet Johannes von Tepl: "As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die."
- ¹⁰ Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in "Being and Time"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- ¹¹ Hubert Dreyfus, Foreword to Carol White, *Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis of Finitude*. M. Ralkowski, ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), xxi.
- ¹² Blattner, *Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 140.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 140.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 149.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 149–50.
- ¹⁶ Blattner, "The Concept of Death in *Being and Time*," *Man and World* 27 (1994): 49–70. Reprinted in H. L. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, eds., *Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death* (London: Routledge, 2002), 314.
- ¹⁷ Macquarrie and Robinson's translation, "anxiety is always latent in being-in-the-world," makes it sound like we're always subliminally psychologically anxious.
- ¹⁸ Sara-Jane Leslie, "Generics: Cognition and Acquisition." *Philosophical Review* 117:1 (2008): 1–47.
- ¹⁹ According to the *OED*, in its early use "readiness" is not always easily distinguished from the archaic "rediness," which meant *wisdom, discretion, prudence*.