

## Is Dasein People? Heidegger According to Haugeland

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*Taylor Carman*

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John Haugeland died three years ago at the age of sixty-five, just after retiring from the University of Chicago. A remarkable thinker, often brilliant, always provocative, he made important contributions to debates about the nature of intentionality and, as the subtitle of his 1985 book has it, “the very idea” of artificial intelligence. Although “AI” as such dates back only to about the middle of the twentieth century, Haugeland pointed out its historical roots in the radically innovative but deeply problematic concept of mind that emerged alongside the mechanistic physical science of the seventeenth century.

Haugeland also earned a reputation as an ingenious interpreter of *Being and Time*, one of the most difficult and controversial philosophical works of the last century. In his 1982 essay “Heidegger on Being a Per-

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son,” Haugeland denied what had until then scarcely occurred to anyone to doubt, namely, that Martin Heidegger uses the word *Dasein* (which in ordinary German just means “existence”) to refer to the individual person or human being. Haugeland regarded that as a disastrous error, indeed one that he thought blinded readers to the whole point of the book. He labored for years on a manuscript that would reveal and explain that point and continued to publish papers on Heidegger along the way (eight of them reprinted in the present volume, two appearing here for the first time). The envisioned opus was to be called *Dasein Disclosed*, and the manuscript—here just over a hundred pages, covering only about the first third of Heidegger’s text—forms the core of the book now bearing that title. The volume has been edited with exquisite intelligence and care by Joseph Rouse, who has also appended the very apt subtitle, *John Haugeland’s Heidegger*.

When *Being and Time* was first published in 1927, many read it as a treatise in what was then known as “philosophical anthropology,” that is, the attempt to answer Kant’s question *What is man?* It was also thought to fall under the rubric of *Existenzphilosophie*, especially once French existentialism had come into intellectual fashion after the war. Heidegger rejected both labels. Instead, as Haugeland rightly says, “The declared, official aim of *Being and Time* is to reawaken the question of the sense of being” (221), that is, the question of what it means for anything at all *to be*—not just human beings but hammers and nails, automobiles, woodpeckers, molecules, and numbers. Such things are. Anything that is, is an entity. But what *is* an entity? What makes an entity an entity? What is it for an entity *to be*? Addressing, if not answering, the question of being is the ultimate aim of *Being and Time*, and, Haugeland continues, “everything in the book should be read as bearing on this aim and this question” (221). What must human life and the world be such that our most fundamental concepts—true and false, right and wrong, knowledge and ignorance, success and failure, appearance and reality—can be so much as intelligible? How do such basic notions manage to make sense to us, as (arguably) they do not to other animals? Haugeland saw, perhaps more clearly than anyone, that that—not human nature, or even the human condition more generally—was Heidegger’s real theme.

Among the traditional philosophical errors and obstacles Heidegger was combating, the deepest and most momentous was, in a word, Cartesianism. Whereas ancient and medieval philosophers understood the soul as the special possession of (at least some) living creatures, René Descartes maintained that mental and biological phenomena had essentially

nothing to do with each other: animals as such, including our own bodies, are unthinking physical mechanisms; the mind, for its part, is a thinking thing, neither extended nor even located in space. Our most fundamental relation to the world we experience is thus a (famously mysterious) causal relation between two distinct, in principle possibly even independently existing, substances: soul and body, mind and world, subject and object. Perception and action, truth and error, knowledge and ignorance are all mere contact points, as it were, between the two elements in that dichotomy.

Haugeland is eloquent in his account of what is so deeply wrong with that Cartesian picture. The fundamental mistake is not the thesis that there are two substances instead of one, as contemporary physicalists maintain, but the more basic assumption that we have any concept of self and world at all apart from their essential unity and inseparability. Haugeland's way of putting this is to say that self and world are not like weights on either end of a barbell but like two sides of a coin (94–95). If you suppose the weights are simply given as separate things, the bar itself will be forever mysterious. A coin, by contrast, is what makes its sides sides: the sides are parts or aspects of the coin, not things added to it. Thus, as Heidegger says, "subject and object do not coincide with *Dasein* and world."<sup>1</sup> *Dasein* and world cannot be understood separately, conceptually distinct, as Descartes supposed mind and body, subject and object, can be. Bypassing that momentous—and to this day, widespread—assumption, *Being and Time* purports to say what makes a world a world, what constitutes a self as a self. Its topic is thus neither mind nor body but the background context that makes those concepts intelligible in the first place, namely our "being-in-the-world." What lies at the heart of Heidegger's project, then, is a rejection not just of the surface doctrines but of the entire conceptual grammar of Cartesian thought.

Nothing in that so far, however, is particularly controversial. Haugeland's unique innovation is to insist that *Dasein* is not Heidegger's word for *self* at all, rather—like the heads and the tails sides of the coin—"Self and world belong together in one entity, *dasein*" (31).<sup>2</sup> An individual person's

1. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 15th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979); hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as *SZ* (translations mine unless otherwise noted). Cf. *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

2. Just as most of us now translate *Sein* as "being" rather than "Being" (and use "entity" for *Seiende*), so Haugeland sought to turn *Dasein* into English (and to his own philosophical purposes) by abolishing the upper-case initial. Except when quoting Haugeland,

existence, that is, is just part of a larger pattern of collective practices, cultural traditions, impersonal norms, possible actions, shared commitments, obstacles, risks—in short, what Haugeland calls “a way of life”—and *that* (not *person*) is, he maintains, what Heidegger meant by *Dasein*. By “way” of life Haugeland does not mean an abstract type or kind (as in “more than one way to skin a cat”) but a historically particular *living*—which is to say, currently being lived—way of life. For Haugeland, moreover, *Dasein* is not just any old bundle of customs or norms but one that embodies an understanding of being, that is, a sense *that* entities in general are and of *what* they are. In a word, for Haugeland, *Dasein* is a “*way of living that embodies an understanding of being*” (81–82). Since such understandings of being disclose worlds, Haugeland’s interpretation promises to make sense of Heidegger’s rather enigmatic claims in *Being and Time* that “*Dasein is its disclosedness*” (SZ, 133), indeed that it “is its there [Da]” (SZ, 135).

Haugeland drew much of his inspiration from a somewhat unexpected source: Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Breaking from the naïve inductivism and theory-centric orientation of traditional philosophy of science, Kuhn describes science not as a unified, cumulatively progressing system of knowledge but as a heterogeneous series of unpredictable innovations. Great discoveries occur during relatively stable periods of what he calls “normal science.” Normal science, however, requires the stabilizing ground and guidance of “paradigms,” that is, frameworks of inquiry constituted by background beliefs, values, established procedures of observation and experiment, perceptual gestalts, and ingrained habits of imagination. Changes of paradigm constitute revolutions of thought and practice, discontinuities that prevent scientists in one age or area of inquiry from simply adopting and building upon, while perhaps modestly revising, the advances and discoveries of their predecessors from previous generations or colleagues from other disciplines. Kuhn, in effect, moved philosophy of science from its traditional static analysis of hypothesis testing, evidence gathering, and theory formation to a concrete depiction of its historical, social, and psychological reality.

Two ideas in Kuhn’s account figure especially prominently in Haugeland’s reading of Heidegger. First, objective knowledge is possible only on the basis of a paradigm that defines at the outset what is and is not worth

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I’m sticking with the capital, in part simply because *Dasein* is not an English word and in part to mark the important difference, as I see it, between Haugeland’s concept and Heidegger’s.

caring about, what is significant or insignificant, possible or impossible. The Heideggerian analogue is the idea that we must already find ourselves thrown into a particular world of things to care about (either more or less), pressing into practical possibilities that constitute our sense of having a future, in order for anything to show up for us in any definite way at all, as being thus or so.

Second, we can ascertain how things stand in the world not just by having but also by being prejudiced in favor of the paradigm in which we find ourselves. Research could not proceed at all if scientists gave up on their theories at the first sign of contrary evidence. Many of the great discoveries in the history of science, after all, have come from wrestling with and solving problems rather than just surrendering to them. Or, in a Heideggerian idiom, only by becoming anxiously yet resolutely committed to some already projected context of meaning are we able to “own up” authentically (*eigentlich*) to our situation in the world. Acquiring knowledge means facing the world as given, which in turn requires being invested in a particular way of thinking, reasoning, believing, seeing, even feeling. Moreover, as Søren Kierkegaard said, commitment without risk is empty, so something important must always be at stake for us. Heidegger’s way of expressing this is to say that we are defined by our having our being before us as an issue, as a question. In the same way, scientific discovery requires that hypotheses, theories, indeed entire research programs put themselves at risk precisely by being open and responsive to evidence, hence genuinely vulnerable to refutation, failure, collapse.

The analogy with Kuhn sheds light on much that might otherwise sound strange or implausible in what Heidegger says about human existence in *Being and Time*, as we shall see. For Haugeland, though, the analogy is no mere analogy. “Dasein is not people,” he writes, with an almost audible sigh. “In my experience, this cannot be said too often” (132). Of course, “the term ‘dasein’ follows in a long tradition of philosophical expressions for what is distinctive of humanity” (77), so that “dasein and people ‘coincide’ in a way” (222). The relation is not one to one, however, like persons to the members of a family, but “something like a checkerboard and the sixty-four squares: people are the squares, and dasein is the board. . . . Thus, no people, no dasein, and vice versa—but, even so, they are not identical” (223). People are not ways of living, hence not Dasein, though of course there *is* a way of living, whether thriving or decaying, only because some people *do* actually live that way.

For Haugeland, then, it is not just that Dasein is *like* chemistry, as

described by Kuhn, then, but that chemistry, understood as a cultural tradition or institution, literally *is* Dasein. Sciences are ideal examples for Haugeland since they are forms or contexts of understanding that disclose worlds—not just the object domains described by the theories but the social and professional milieus inhabited by the scientists. Haugeland was right that the central theme of *Being and Time* is not Dasein as such but Dasein's mode of being, which Heidegger calls *Existenz* and in which, he says, sciences and languages also partake. Italian, for example, is a living language, just as chemistry is a thriving research program, whereas Etruscan is a dead language and alchemy a failed science. "In a handful of places," Haugeland tells us, Heidegger "says or suggests that sciences (and also languages) exist. But since existence is the way of being peculiar to dasein, that implies that sciences and languages are daseins" (182).

That, I believe, is a non sequitur. Heidegger does once or twice say that sciences and languages "exist." Tellingly, though, he does *not* infer, as Haugeland does, that they are therefore Dasein. For example, "As practices of man, sciences have the mode of being of this entity (man). This entity we shall refer to as *Dasein*" (SZ, 11). What this sentence says is that Dasein is "man," or "the human being" (*der Mensch*), and that sciences have the mode of being of *that* entity. It does not say that they *are* that entity.

Does it follow from a thing's having the mode of being of *Xs* that it, too, is an *X*? Heidegger never says so, nor is it obvious. Properties, relations, and facts, after all, share in the objectivity of objects but are not themselves objects. To say that their being is objectivity, or what Heidegger calls "occurrentness [*Vorhandenheit*]," is to say that we understand objects by (also) understanding their properties, facts about them, and how they are related to one another. So too, purposes, adjustments, functions and mal-functions share in the being of equipment but are not themselves tools. To say that their being is "availability [*Zuhandenheit*]" is to say that we understand tools by (also) understanding what they are for, how to deal with them, and how they work (or fail to). In saying that science and language "exist," I think Heidegger has something similar in mind, namely, that understanding human beings means (also) understanding practices, institutions, words, speech acts, texts, and so on. That science and language "exist," then, no more implies that they are Dasein than their being *human* practices implies that they are human *beings*.

Another passage Haugeland leans on heavily is a comment Heidegger makes almost in passing, not in *Being and Time* but in lectures he gave later the same year, published posthumously under the title *The Basic*

*Problems of Phenomenology*. Language, he says there, “is, insofar as it is, just as Dasein is, i.e. language exists, it is historical.”<sup>3</sup> Here the point of the comparison is to say that languages, being *human* languages, share some of the defining features of human life, in particular growth and decay: languages are born, they age, they die off; perhaps they can even be said to bear memory traces of their own past selves. The “just as” in Heidegger’s sentence, however, is a comparison of one thing with another, not an identification. If he meant to say that language *is* Dasein, his remark would be as weird as someone saying, “Philosophy professors get downtown just like human beings do, i.e. they take the subway.”

## 2

Perhaps not surprisingly, although Haugeland’s approach to *Being and Time* is deep and original in its own way, his specific thesis concerning Heidegger’s use of the word *Dasein* has not won many adherents. It remained, as he says in a 2002 lecture included in the book, “a controversial reading—approximately, me against everybody else” (224). That is an overstatement, but only a mild one. The view that emerges from *Dasein Disclosed* is unquestionably philosophically rich and productive, but it is also something of a Procrustean bed into which Haugeland often has to strain to fit his subject.

His interpretation hinges on the question concerning what Heidegger calls “the who” of Dasein. He says explicitly in chapter 4 of the first division of *Being and Time* (§25) that this question goes beyond what he has already said in chapter 1 (§9), namely, “We are each of us [*je*]<sup>4</sup> the entity to be analyzed. The being of this entity is *always mine* [*je meines*]” (SZ, 41). Haugeland thus rightly says of Descartes that “in expressing himself as ‘*I myself*,’ he expressed something deeply right about dasein as such” (131); “The phenomenon of the ‘*I myself*’ . . . is essential to dasein” (132). So far, so good.

Heidegger is clear, however, that in asking about the who of Dasein in §25, he is *not* asking the question he has *already* answered in §9. What

3. Martin Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1975), 296. Cf. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter, rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 208.

4. In the margin of his own copy of *Being and Time*, after “each of us [*je*],” Heidegger later added “each ‘*I*’ [*je ‘ich*].”

we already know from chapter 1, Heidegger now reminds us, is, “Dasein is the entity that I myself always [*je*] am; its being is always [*je*] mine. This definition *indicates* an *ontological* constitution, but only that. At the same time, it contains the *ontic*—albeit crude—claim that this entity is always an I, and not others” (SZ, 114).

Like many other passages in *Being and Time*, this strongly suggests that Dasein just is the individual human being. Earlier in the text, for example, Heidegger writes, “Since Dasein has the character of *mineness* [*Jemeinigkeit*], it must always [*stets*] be addressed using the *personal* pronoun: ‘I am,’ ‘you are’ [*‘du bist’*]” (SZ, 42). What better to address with personal pronouns than persons?

Heidegger, I believe, is making essentially the same point in the two passages. Dasein is what the pronouns *I* and *you* (singular) express or refer to. In other words, to the question *Who is Dasein?*, the natural and obvious—crude but correct—answer is, for example, “me” (or “you” or “him” or “her”). We identify Dasein, that is, by picking out particular persons, as in a roll call. “The who” is not the name of any particular people (as it was the name of Pete Townshend’s band), nor is it the somehow average or typical person (Everyman, Joe Blow, John Q. Public). As Haugeland rightly says, “the who of everyday dasein is neither . . . ordinary, normal people themselves nor anything like an amalgam or average of them” (132). Rather, the who is *anyone*—or, in Heidegger’s jargon, “the anyone” (*das Man*). So again, the who is, for example, *me*—but more precisely *any* “me,” no one in particular. Haugeland’s way of putting this is to say that the who is *the person* or *I myself*, where each of those expressions functions as what Wilfrid Sellars calls a “distributive singular term,” like “the penguin” in the sentence “The penguin is a flightless bird.” For Haugeland, then, to say that the who of everyday Dasein is the anyone is the same as saying that it is “the” (any) particular individual person; it is “I myself,” which is to say *any* “I.”

Haugeland is right, of course, that the first person is essential to Dasein. His point here, however, it seems to me, is precisely the point (already presented in chapter 1 of *Being and Time*) that Heidegger says *misses* the point he is making in chapter 4 concerning “the anyone.” That the who of Dasein is *I myself* is what Heidegger calls the ontologically formal, “ontically obvious” fact that Dasein is always *mine*. Haugeland in effect reads Heidegger’s account of the anyone as if it merely restates or perhaps amplifies that same obvious but formal, crude albeit correct, claim.

One indication that something has gone wrong is that Haugeland *equates* the anyone with the *I myself* (133), both notions characterizing for

him the individual person, which he maintains is not identical with Dasein. That is very odd, to say the least, considering that Heidegger's central thesis in chapter 4 is precisely that the who of everyday Dasein is (in some sense) *not* I myself but *rather* the anyone: "It could be that I myself am precisely *not* always the who of everyday Dasein" (SZ, 115). *Instead*, Heidegger says, "The 'who' is the neuter, *the anyone* [*das Man*]" (SZ, 126).

To his credit, Haugeland acknowledges that the distinction Heidegger draws here between I myself and the anyone is a puzzle for his interpretation. Indeed, he wonders how his reading "can be reconciled with the passage" (134), since in it Heidegger flatly states that I myself am *not* the who of everyday Dasein. To understand Haugeland's solution to the puzzle, it is necessary to see how he translates Heidegger's sentence, and indeed how he translates Heidegger's use of personal pronouns generally to prevent them from seeming to refer to Dasein.

Heidegger introduces the term *Dasein* near the beginning of *Being and Time*. There he writes, "This entity that we ourselves each are and that has in its being *inter alia* the possibility of questioning, we shall refer to as *Dasein*" (SZ, 7). Haugeland translates this sentence, "That entity, which we ourselves *in each case* are, and which includes inquiring among the possibilities of its being, we call dasein" (76, my emphasis). Elsewhere in the text, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translate the German *je* as "in each case," a turn of phrase Haugeland enlists here and then further extends in his own terminological convention: "For expository convenience," he writes, "I will take advantage of the English phrase 'in each case' to introduce the new expression *case of dasein* as a general term for us as individual people" (82). The phrase "in each case" is, of course, an artifact of translation, one that plays a crucial role in Haugeland's reading, supplying a new term to do the work most readers have supposed the word *Dasein* is already doing in the text.<sup>5</sup>

The puzzling sentence in §25 is, "Es könnte sein, daß das Wer des alltäglichen Daseins gerade *nicht je* ich selbst bin."<sup>6</sup> Haugeland translates this, "It could be that I myself, in each case, am precisely not the who of everyday dasein" (134). So, in reply to his own question about how this

5. In German, of course, *case*, as in "a case of something," is not *je* but *Fall*.

6. Macquarrie and Robinson's translation captures what I believe is, in fact, the correct understanding of the sentence, but it deviates significantly from Heidegger's grammar by making "the who" the subject of the sentence and inserting a definite article before "I myself": "It could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is *not* the 'I myself'" (*Being and Time*, 150).

can be consistent with his own equating *I myself* with *anyone*, Haugeland writes,

The answer, I think, is clear. The phrase “I myself in each case” intends each respective case of *dasein* as a distinct I-myself—as if each of them him- or herself might be “the” who of everyday *dasein*. This is what the quoted passage is calling into question. The proposal I am making, by contrast, does not (directly) involve *any* individual cases of *dasein*. “The I-myself,” taken as a distributive singular term, does not refer to individuals but rather to the typical, ordinary I-myself. The quotation does not bear on this proposal at all. (134)

As Haugeland reads the text, that is, when Heidegger distinguishes *I myself* from *the anyone*, the phrase “I myself” is *not* a distributive singular but a pronoun referring to one concrete particular person, namely *one-self*—in my case, Taylor Carman. To say that “I myself” am *not* the who of everyday *Dasein* is just to say that since it is *anyone*, it is therefore not uniquely *me*. As Haugeland reads it, that is, what Heidegger is saying in this sentence is that no single one of us is the who of everyday *Dasein*, and since Haugeland, for his part, is not talking about concrete particular persons at all, he dismisses the passage as irrelevant to his argument.

This is very implausible. To begin with, it is odd, to say the least, to translate “gerade *nicht je ich selbst bin*” as “I myself, in each case, am precisely not.” It is worth remembering that the German word *je* does not only mean “per,” “apiece,” or “respective,” as in Haugeland’s construal, but also “ever” or “always,” as in *kaum je* (hardly ever), *mehr denn je* (more than ever), and *wie eh und je* (as always). A closer English equivalent of “*nicht je ich selbst bin*” would be (something like) “I myself am precisely *not* always.” Thus my rendering, “It could be that I myself am precisely *not* always the who of everyday *Dasein*” (SZ, 115).

Of course, reading *je* in the sense of “ever” or “always” rather than “each” or “respectively” does not settle the interpretive question, since one could still read the sentence, even as I translate it, as saying that I—that is, *me*, Taylor Carman—am not always the who of everyday *Dasein*. But what would it mean to say that?

The question *Who is NN?* might be answered in (at least) three different ways. First, NN could be known *de dicto* by knowing that he satisfies a certain description, or cluster of descriptions: US citizen, New York resident, professor of philosophy, and so on. Second, NN could be known

*de re* by knowing that he is *this* particular one, designated “rigidly” (as Saul Kripke says), either by proper name, pronoun, or by his raising his hand. Third, I can know “who” NN is in a very different and deeper way by understanding him, his situation, his life, what matters to him, and how he understands himself, what he can and cannot, must and must not, do, and so on. In that case, I know “who” he is by having a sense of his identity, the content and direction of his life. Obviously, I can know perfectly well who NN is in the first two, more banal ways—knowing that he is, say, a *professor*, and that he is *this* one here—without knowing who he is in the third, more robust person sense.

On Haugeland’s reading, Heidegger’s puzzling sentence distinguishes the second of those forms of identification from the first and says nothing about the third. That is, it claims that the who of everyday Dasein is not you or me (*de re*) but rather anyone satisfying a certain generic description—something like “person” (*de dicto*). Of course, Heidegger cannot have meant to say that the who of everyday Dasein is “not always” some particular person—say, his sister or Max Schmeling. Perhaps Haugeland supposes instead that Heidegger was denying that it is “I myself,” namely the one now asking the question. This cannot be right, either, since it makes as little sense for me to say that the who of everyday Dasein is not always Taylor Carman as it does for me to say that it is not always Max Schmeling.

The question concerning the who of everyday Dasein is, in a sense, a question one asks about oneself. This is not, however, because the “I myself” in Heidegger’s sentence refers to *me* but because the Dasein in question is not what Haugeland takes it to be, namely a collectively lived way of life. This question about Dasein, the question *who* it is, must instead be a question Dasein asks about itself. From the outset, that is, pace Haugeland, the Dasein about whom Heidegger asks *Who is it?* is already the person.

The question concerning the who of everyday Dasein, then, is a question in the third of the three senses I distinguished above, namely, *How does Dasein understand itself, its situation, its life?* I know I am Taylor Carman—a professor in New York, and indeed *this* person—but who is *that*? In denying that “I myself” am the who of everyday Dasein, Heidegger is saying that in its everyday existence Dasein (the person) understands himself or herself not under the aspect *I myself*, but under the aspect *anyone*. What does that mean? It is not, of course, that I do not say “I” when speaking about or for myself, or (absurdly) that, for all I know, I could turn out to be anyone, say, Heidegger’s sister or Max Schmeling. It

means that I do not ordinarily understand myself as a *solus ipse*, a metaphysically distinctive subject, a privileged, focal, or central ego standing on its own in stark contrast to alien others who appear “out there” in my world, over against me. Instead, I see myself as just another one of *us*, “just like anyone”—not, of course, qualitatively *the same* as everyone else, just not metaphysically special, unique, or peculiar, like the isolated, strangely worldless *res cogitans*.

### 3

Another consequence of Haugeland’s identification of *I myself* with *the anyone* is his surprising denial that Heidegger draws any contrast in chapter 4 between *I myself* and “others.” Rather, he proposes, “Heidegger’s official term for individual people is ‘others’” (124). It is true that Heidegger does, in a certain sense, blur the metaphysical distinction between *I myself* and *others*. So, for example, he writes,

“Others” does not mean everyone else besides me, from whom the I stands out; others are rather those from whom one does *not* for the most part distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is. (SZ, 118)

One belongs to others oneself. . . . “Others,” whom one so calls by way of concealing one’s own essential belonging to them . . . (SZ, 126)

Haugeland reads these sentences as asserting a straightforward identity: “The term ‘other,’” he writes, “is coextensive with the term ‘person’” (124).

Although I believe Haugeland is again misreading the text, there is, of course, something right in what he says here. As he puts it, “one is oneself just another other” (124). He concedes “the very term ‘others’ is conspicuously odd. For, even though it subsumes everybody—one is oneself ‘just another other’—one is precisely not an ‘other’ *to oneself*. Rather, in each case, *dasein* is *I myself* to itself” (129).

That is right. Or rather, would be if, instead of saying “in each case, *dasein* is *I myself*,” Haugeland had said simply—as Heidegger does—that “I am that which *Dasein* always [*je*] is” (SZ, 115). It is true that each of us is “just another other” and yet “precisely not an ‘other’ *to oneself*.” That is indeed because, as Haugeland says, each of us is, to him- or herself,

*I myself*. So far, so good. But that, as far as it goes, is just a reminder of the indexicality of pronouns and the generic concept of a person. Recall that Heidegger does not distinguish, as Haugeland does, between Dasein and “cases of” Dasein, but says of Dasein *as such* that “this entity is always [*je*] an I, and not others” (SZ, 114). Here “other” is evidently not just a generic term for *person*, applying as much to me myself qua *I* as to anyone else. It is instead the contrasting category that puts into relief the singularity of the entity that, Heidegger tells us, can ask the question of being, hence the entity that *both* is inquiring into the being of Dasein *and* is itself the entity at issue in that inquiry.

This is not to say that in everyday life we already understand ourselves as metaphysically unique or privileged subjects, like the Cartesian *ego*, or merely that each I (of course) calls itself “I,” just as every moment in time *when it occurs* is (of course) “now.” To introduce the distinction between myself and others into the very heart of the analytic of Dasein is to say that that distinction is definitive of Dasein itself, indeed that it identifies Dasein as that entity which, in its most fundamental self-understanding, distinguishes *itself* from others with whom it finds itself.

Haugeland supposes that in Heidegger’s jargon *others* is just a blanket term for persons, as if that were a mere—though, he admits, “conspicuously odd”—terminological stipulation. It certainly would be odd, were it nothing but an eccentric choice of words on Heidegger’s part. Of course, it is not just that. The reason Heidegger calls persons in general, including oneself, “others” is not just that each of us is an “other” to others, that is, that John is not Paul and Paul is not George. The reason is that Dasein *itself* is always essentially “I myself,” and that the distinction between I and others is not equivalent to the mere *plurality* of persons but instead constitutes a *single* fundamental structure of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger very deliberately draws a distinction between, as the title of §26 has it, “the being-there-with [*Mitdasein*] of others and everyday being-with [*Mitsein*]” (SZ, 117). These are clearly *two* distinct modes of being: the latter *my* being with others, the former *their* being with me. Why would Heidegger want to draw that distinction? If we are all in the world together, as he insists we are, isn’t our *being-together* just a single mode of being that we share? Does not distinguishing mine from yours land us back in the Cartesian idea that the ego is a self-sufficient subject with a metaphysically privileged status, after all? Thus, Jean-Paul Sartre argued, for example, that I have *my* world of conscious experience and you have *yours*, and that you confront me as a kind of intruder, a subject who appears as

a quasi object in my world, just as I feel my subjectivity diminished to the status of a quasi object in yours. That dramatic encounter of competing subjects is (quite literally) worlds away from Heidegger's account of our shared everyday being-with. Why then does he go out of his way to introduce a second term with which to distinguish, in effect, mine from yours?

Haugeland recognizes that the distinction between *Mitsein* and *Mitdasein*—which he somewhat confusingly translates as “being-co” and “co-dasein,” respectively (125)—is an *ontological* distinction, that is, a distinction between modes of being. Moreover, perhaps understandably, he takes it to entail an *ontic* distinction, that is, a distinction between two different entities: Dasein and people.

That, I believe, is a mistake. Admittedly, the terminological distinction appears to threaten the reintroduction of an unwelcome dichotomy between self as subject and self as object, the “empirical-transcendental double” that, according to Michel Foucault, characterizes post-Kantian thought generally. Heidegger, however, rejects that dichotomy, not by denying that Dasein is, in its essential structure, both *I myself* and an “other” (to others) but by denying that I am subject and other is object. Put another way, Heidegger's analytic of Dasein is an attempt to comprehend the human being as the entity that is not somehow (paradoxically) *both* subject and object but fundamentally *neither*. Our being is both *being-with* others (qua I myself) and *being-there-with* others (qua other to them). The fact that Heidegger makes use of two terms to describe those complementary dimensions or aspects of our sociality no more entails that we are dual or divided things than does his description of us as *both* “thrown” into an already constituted world *and* “projecting” into future-constituting possibilities. Far from marking a distinction between Dasein and persons, the terms *Mitsein* and *Mitdasein* simply point up that it is constitutive of the existence of each Dasein—that is, each person—both to *encounter* and to *be encountered* by others.

What is ultimately at stake in Haugeland's conception of Dasein, it seems to me, is whether and to what extent something like the *first person* is constitutive of the very entity Heidegger is describing in *Being and Time*. Haugeland acknowledges that it is essential to being-in-the-world that, as he puts it, “in each case, dasein is *I myself* to itself” (129). It is no small terminological matter that he displaces the *I myself* from Dasein proper to (what he calls) “cases of dasein.” That displacement is not just a reshuffling of jargon but has deep consequences, since it implies that the methodological perspective of *Being and Time* itself is the standpoint not of the

individual human being but of the impersonal (or perhaps *cross-personal*) phenomenon of (something like) cultural practice and tradition, Haugeland's "living way of life."

In "Heidegger on Being a Person," the 1982 article I mentioned earlier, the first of the two "Early Papers" reprinted here, Haugeland had argued that Dasein is defined by social norms through and through. He later repudiated this view, for example, in one of the six "Late Papers" also included at the end of the volume, the 2007 "Death and Dasein," where he writes, "it would be a grievous mistake to suppose—as I once did—that social normativity is . . . the essence of dasein" (182). In his mature view, Haugeland maintains that living ways of life are lived by individual persons, centers of affect and agency who can take them up and take responsibility for them, or fail to, and who can do so *either* by conforming to norms and traditions *or* by breaking with them, even radically. Haugeland, in other words, is no Hegelian: the human agent is, for him, the individual person, not *Weltgeist*.

However, in leaving behind not only the self-sufficient Cartesian subject but the first-person standpoint altogether, Haugeland elides the methodological point of view from which *Being and Time* is written, and from which, I believe, it must be read. What Heidegger says about the who, I myself, others, and the anyone are claims made about Dasein *by Dasein, from Dasein's* point of view. Haugeland, by contrast, reads them as straightforward metaphysical assertions. What gets lost is the point Heidegger makes early in *Being and Time*, namely, that the project of fundamental ontology, in addition to having its theme (*sein Gefragtes*) and its goal (*das Erfragte*), takes Dasein itself as its witness, its interlocutor, its source of insight (*des Befragte*): "Inquiry, as the comportment of an entity, the inquirer," he writes, "does not become transparent to itself until all these constitutive factors of the question have themselves become transparent" (SZ, 5).

What is not transparent in Haugeland's construction, it seems to me, is precisely the last of those three factors: Dasein's status as both, so to speak, prosecutor and witness for the prosecution, both questioner and interlocutor. That dual status vanishes with Haugeland's distinction between Dasein and persons. The effect is that, all too often, where Heidegger makes concretely contextualized phenomenological observations, interpretations from the point of view of individual experience, Haugeland transposes them into free-floating metaphysical claims.

Imposing his own distinction between Dasein and "cases of" Dasein also allows Haugeland to sidestep an abundance of textual evidence

incompatible with his interpretation. For example, Heidegger explicitly says that *Dasein* is the entity that *requires* personal pronouns, in particular the first- and second-person singular: “Since *Dasein* has the character of *mine-ness* [*Jemeinigkeit*], it must always [*stets*] be addressed using the *personal* pronoun: ‘I am,’ ‘you are’ [*du bist*]” (SZ, 42, Heidegger’s emphasis)—words hardly applicable to quantum physics or Mandarin Chinese. Heidegger also says, as we have seen, that *Dasein* designates the same thing designated by the word *man* (*Mensch*), with no hint of its being parceled out as anything other than individual human beings (*Menschen*). If he meant to suggest that *Dasein* is individuated in any other way, he might have said so.

In spite of all this, the entire edifice of Haugeland’s reading of *Being and Time* by no means stands or falls with his eccentric construal of the term *Dasein*. Correct or incorrect on that score, Haugeland has left us a profound and powerful book, one that is sure to remain both inspiring and controversial for years to come. Indeed, therein lies one of the most authentically Heideggerian aspects of his work. For like Heidegger’s own provocative, at times violent, treatments of other thinkers—most notably, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and his two monumental *Nietzsche* volumes—*Dasein Disclosed* is best read not as exegesis or commentary but as a kind of creative dialogue, or the ongoing inner conversation one has with an absent friend. Even, or perhaps especially, when they part ways, two lines of thought can shed light on each other and, in so doing, illuminate the space between them.